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Increasing access to data and advanced statistical methods can help auditors 
generate independent expectations of estimates, but expectations are not useful unless 
auditors rely on them. However, advanced methods are likely more opaque (i.e., more 
difficult to understand due to a lack of transparency), which in turn affects understanding 
of the output of the method, such as independent expectations. I predict that auditors rely 
less on independent expectations generated with more opaque audit methods. I further 
predict that developing psychological ownership of independent expectations increases 
reliance on expectations generated using more opaque methods, while ownership is not 
critical for reliance on expectations generated using less opaque methods. In an experiment 
with senior auditors, I find results supporting my predictions, specifically for auditors with 
relevant task experience. This study provides insights into auditors’ use of independent 






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and Research Question 
Auditors tend to over-rely on management’s assertions when auditing estimates, but 
this issue can be improved by auditors’ use of independent expectations of estimates 
(PCAOB 2018; Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous (hereafter “GHK”) 2015). Auditors 
generate independent expectations less often than they test the assumptions in 
management’s estimates in part because they often lack data or knowledge to do so (GHK 
2015; Glover, Taylor, and Wu 2017; Cannon and Bedard 2017). Increasing access to data 
and advanced statistical methods may help auditors more readily develop independent 
expectations. However, independent expectations will be valuable only to the extent that 
auditors rely on them relative to management’s estimates, and I argue that attributes of the 
methods auditors use to generate independent expectations can impact their reliance on 
expectations. In this research, I experimentally examine whether the opacity inherent in 
advanced methods affects auditor reliance on independent expectations and how auditors’ 
psychological ownership of the expectations interacts with opacity to affect reliance.  
1.2 Summary of Predictions 
I predict that auditors rely less on independent expectations generated with more 
opaque audit methods. At its broadest definition, opacity is “the quality of being difficult 
to understand or know about” resulting from a lack of transparency (Cambridge, n.d.). 
Audit firms use increasingly advanced statistical methods, such as audit data analytics 
(“ADA”), to more efficiently perform audit tasks that could otherwise be done using basic 
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analytical techniques such as manual examination of numbers and simple calculations 
(Deloitte 2016; AICPA 2017; Austin, Carpenter, Christ, and Nielsen 2020). Advanced 
methods are likely more opaque, for a few reasons. One, as complexity of processes 
increases, it becomes more difficult and sometimes not feasible to clearly explain or show 
the processes. The inputs and output of an audit procedure may be relatively clear while 
the process linking them is not, leading to reduced transparency and in turn understanding 
of the output. Two, previous familiarity with the methods can affect understanding and  
perceptions of opacity even when the processes are explained (Burton, Stein, and Jenson 
2020).  
Research finds that individuals often prefer to rely on their own judgments or human 
expert advice relative to recommendations from statistical sources such as artificial 
intelligence and decision aids (Whitecotton and Butler 1998; Chen, Hudgins, and Wright 
2018; Commerford, Dennis, Joe, and Ulla 2020). I argue that greater opacity of the decision 
process underlying these statistical sources likely causes individuals to prefer their own 
judgment, since they are more aware of their own process.  
Greater trust in their own or a human expert’s judgment likely also affects 
individuals’ reliance on statistical sources. I predict that increased auditor psychological 
ownership—a feeling that something is “yours”—of independent expectations increases 
their reliance on expectations, but only when using more opaque audit methods. 
Psychological ownership of independent expectations should increase when auditors use 
more professional audit judgment to develop expectations because of increased feelings of 
control and critical thinking (Pierce, O’Driscoll, and Coughlin 2004; Brown, Pierce, and 
Crossley 2014). Research shows that individuals more positively evaluate objects of 
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ownership (Beggan 1992; Nesselroade, Began, and Allison 1999). Thus, auditors should 
rely more on their “own” expectation, shifting reliance away from management evidence. 
However, ownership is likely less critical for increasing reliance on independent 
expectations generated with less opaque audit methods since they are easier to understand. 
1.3 Summary of Research 
I test my hypotheses using an experiment with senior auditors from two Big 4 audit 
firms. I developed a case in which auditors generate an independent expectation of product 
warranty accrual and use it to assess the reasonableness of management’s estimate. I 
manipulate the method opacity (More Opaque or Less Opaque) and psychological 
ownership (More Ownership or Less Ownership) in a 2x2 between-participants design.  
I manipulate opacity in two ways—familiarity of the method used to generate the 
independent expectation and visibility of the process linking the inputs and output. In the 
More Opaque (Less Opaque) condition, instructions explain that a predictive model 
(calculation) computes expected warranty claims in a data analytics tool (Excel). Then, the 
tool output, which provides the independent expectation, shows only the inputs and the 
output (More Opaque condition), or shows the calculation linking the inputs to the output 
as well (Less Opaque condition). In the More Ownership (Less Ownership) condition, 
participants specify (are told their team has specified) a critical input to the independent 
expectation. I operationalize opacity using ADA given recent academic, regulator, and 
practitioner interest in the topic and its relevance to my constructs of interest (e.g., Deloitte 
2016; Austin et al. 2020, PCAOB 2020).  
 4
My dependent variable is participants’ reliance on the independent expectation. 
Specifically, I infer reliance from their assessed likelihood that management’s estimate is 
misstated. I hold constant the dollar value of the independent expectation, which is 
materially higher than management’s estimate, indicating an understatement. If 
participants rely more on the independent expectation, they should place more weight on 
it and assess greater likelihood that management’s estimate is misstated.  
Results indicate that specifying a critical input to the independent expectation 
increases psychological ownership of the expectation, as expected; however, initial 
analysis does not indicate an effect of opacity or psychological ownership on reliance on 
the expectation. I test my predictions with planned contrast tests because my theory 
development led me to predict a specific pattern of means (Guggenmos, Piercy, and 
Agoglia 2018). Further analysis reveals that task experience (e.g., familiarity with product 
warranty), which also affects auditors’ understanding of the estimate and inputs, moderates 
my predicted effects. Specifically, I find a 3-way interaction indicating that the effect of 
opacity and ownership differ for participants who report more versus less task experience.  
Low experience with the independent expectation setting (e.g., product warranty) 
affects understanding of the inputs to the expectation, and my theory and independent 
variables assume understanding of the inputs (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002). For 
participants with some task experience, I re-perform my planned contrast tests. Test results 
indicate that my hypotheses are supported. I find a good visual fit of the pattern of means 
suggested by my contrast codes (-3 for the More Opaque, Less Ownership condition, +1 
for all other conditions) with my observed data. The significant contrast test result suggests 
that given some task experience, auditors’ reliance on independent expectations is lower 
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when they use more opaque methods to generate expectations, but that developing 
ownership over expectations mitigates the effect of opacity. 
Results further indicate that when using more opaque methods, the effect of 
ownership on reliance may differ for auditors with more versus less task experience. When 
there is both opacity and less involvement required, such as in the Less Ownership 
condition, reduced understanding of the setting could lead to lower motivation to scrutinize 
the evidence, resulting in “blind” reliance on the independent expectation (Parasuraman 
and Manzey, 2010). However, the accountability that auditors have for their conclusions 
could alleviate motivation issues, and participants were not required to document or explain 
the reasonableness judgment. Further research may be warranted to examine the effects of 
task experience.  
1.4 Contributions 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. I add to research on auditors’ 
judgments in the audit of estimates and independent expectations (e.g., Griffin 2014; 
Griffith, Hammersley, Kadous, and Young 2015; Griffith 2018; Austin, Hammersley, and 
Ricci 2020; Fitzgerald, Williams-Smith, Wolfe, and Garza 2020). I examine whether 
auditors’ reliance on contradictory evidence can be improved (e.g., Bratten, Gaynor, 
McDaniel, Montague, and Sierra 2013; GHK 2015), and I examine factors that affect 
auditors’ reliance on independent expectations that have not been well explored in prior 
research (e.g., Griffin 2014; Fitzgerald et al. 2020).  
This study also answers a call to understand the behavioral implications of ADA, 
given my operationalization of opacity (Brown-Liburd, Issa, and Lombardi 2015). Recent 
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research has examined reliance on data analytic sources relative to human advice (Chen et 
al. 2018; Commerford et al. 2020) and the effect of data visualizations on auditor 
judgments (Rose, Rose, Sanderson, and Thibodeau 2017 and 2019). I extend this work by 
examining reliance on different methods and the effects of opacity and auditor 
psychological ownership of ADA. 
In addition, this study also has practical implications. My findings suggest that when 
auditors use more opaque methods, their involvement in and ownership of the output of 
the methods and their task experience are both critical factors to consider when 
implementing the methods in practice. Specialists may be heavily involved in developing 
such procedures, but engagement teams have superior knowledge about client inputs 
relative to specialists.  
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Independent Expectations and ADA 
Auditing standards allow for three different methods to substantively test 
estimates—testing management’s process and assumptions, testing subsequent events or 
transactions, and developing an independent expectation of the estimate (PCAOB 2018). 
Audit inspections and academic research find that auditors most often choose to test 
management’s process and assumptions (GHK 2015; Cannon and Bedard 2017; PCAOB 
2017) but that auditors often over-rely on management evidence when testing their process 
and assumptions (Bratten et al. 2013; PCAOB 2017). Research suggests that generating 
independent expectations of estimates can help mitigate over-reliance on management 
evidence (PCAOB 2018; GHK 2015; Fitzgerald et al. 2020).1  
Availability of data is cited by auditors as a key reason that they may not choose to 
generate independent expectations and instead only test the assumptions in management’s 
estimates (Glover et al. 2017). Increasing access to data and proliferation of advanced 
statistical methods, such as ADA that allow auditors to accomplish tasks in a more efficient 
and potentially more effective manner could help auditors more readily generate 
independent expectations (e.g., Deloitte 2016; Austin et al. 2020).  
 
1 According to auditing standards, “Developing an independent expectation involves the auditor using some 
or all of his or her own methods, data, and assumptions to develop an expectation of the estimate for 
comparison to the company's estimate” (PCAOB, 2018). 
 8
However, generating independent expectations does not necessarily result in 
auditors’ full reliance on them. Auditors compare independent expectations to 
management’s estimates and may still test management’s assumptions and process, 
requiring auditors to compare evidence. Research finds that even when auditors have 
evidence that contradicts management’s assertions, auditors are often reluctant to challenge 
management’s assertions, leading them to over-rely on management’s evidence (Bratten et 
al. 2013; GHK 2015). Reluctance to challenge management’s assertions can be driven by 
a variety of factors; for example, auditors often anchor to or have incentive to confirm 
management’s estimates, and the subjectivity inherent in estimates further adds to the 
subjectivity of auditor reliance on independent expectations. (Bratten et al. 2013; GHK 
2015; Cannon and Bedard 2017; Glover et al. 2017).  
Therefore, it is important to better understand auditors’ reliance on independent 
expectations. Prior research has examined whether the level of subjectivity or precision 
(i.e., narrow or wide range) of independent expectations (Griffin 2014) and the timing of 
generating independent expectations relative to receiving management’s estimates 
(Fitzgerald et al. 2020) affect reliance. In this study, I examine whether the method auditors 
use to develop independent expectations affects their reliance on expectations. Specifically, 
I argue that the opacity inherent in certain methods, such as ADA, affects auditors’ reliance 
on the output (e.g., an independent expectation) of the methods, and that psychological 
ownership of expectations can moderate the effect of opacity.  
2.2 Use of Opaque Audit Methods (H1) 
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An important point is that using more advanced audit methods does not necessarily 
improve effectiveness of audit procedures, such as accuracy of independent expectations, 
relative to using less advanced audit methods to perform the same task. For example, 
different methods can use historical relationships among the same data to generate 
independent expectations of management’s estimate. Accuracy may not necessarily 
improve when using more advanced statistical methods because inputs and specific 
calculations are often highly subjective or subject to change. Given similar effectiveness 
of different audit methods, auditors’ reliance on the specific output of the different methods 
when forming their audit conclusions should not necessarily differ.  
However, the process underlying advanced statistical methods is often a “black 
box,” meaning that the process linking the inputs and output is not shown or explained. 
Opacity is inherent in many advanced methods simply because it becomes more difficult 
to explain processes as complexity increases (Burton et al. 2020). While complexity and 
opacity are often correlated, they are distinct. That is, complexity may increase opacity, 
but opacity can exist without the underlying process necessarily being complex. More 
specifically, I expect that “black box” processes remain relatively opaque to the user, even 
if they are not necessarily complex.  
To illustrate an example: the mathematics underlying even a simple linear 
regression are typically not explained or shown. On the other hand, auditors can generally 
“see” a calculation that uses familiar analytical techniques such as manual examination of 
numbers and calculations, even if it is relatively complex (e.g., a compound calculation 
done in spreadsheet software).  
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Additionally, opacity is in the mind of the beholder. Familiarity or previous 
experience with a method can also affect understanding and, in turn, perceived opacity of 
the process (Burton et al. 2020). A process may remain opaque to an individual even when 
the process is explained; for example, auditors may not well understand even relatively 
simple statistical methods such as a linear regression with a few predictor variables if the 
underlying statistics are not well explained or if auditors do not have much experience with 
them or understanding of the calculations underlying regressions. I therefore expect that 
previous familiarity with audit methods further exacerbates perceived opacity of the 
methods.  
Opacity likely affects auditors’ ability to process and understand the output of more 
or less opaque audit methods, and I argue that opacity, in turn, affects reliance on the output 
of the methods. Research finds that individuals often prefer to rely on their own judgments 
or human expert judgments relative to non-human sources such as “algorithm” advice and 
decision tools (Whitecotton and Butler 1998; Lee and See 2004; Hoff and Bashir 2015; 
Parkes 2017; Dietvorst, Simmons, and Massey 2018; Chen et al. 2018; Commerford et al. 
2020).2 I argue that opacity impacts the aversion to relying on non-human sources. For 
example, non-human sources are often relatively opaque because the decision process 
underlying the non-human source is not well explained. On the other hand, individuals are 
aware of their own decision process, leading them to prefer their own judgment over that 
of the non-human source.  
 
2 I classify decision aids and automated decision tools as data analytic tools because they utilize data inputs 
and various analytics to generate recommendations to support individuals’ decision-making or fully 
automate decisions. 
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The directional effects of opacity on reliance on the output of different methods 
likely depends on motivation and incentives. When individuals do not have strong 
incentive or motivation to scrutinize opaque decision tools, users may use the 
recommendation as a heuristic in place of information processing (Parasuraman and 
Manzey 2010). For example, Chen et al. (2018) find that aversion to non-human advice is 
mitigated when individuals do not have incentive to deeply assess the source of the advice. 
In certain cases, individuals may even rely more on recommendations from non-human 
sources than human advice, particularly when the human advisor is not an expert (Logg, 
Minson, and Moore 2019). I expect that because auditors often unconsciously anchor to or 
have incentive to confirm management’s estimate, auditors do have incentive to consider 
the source of information. Therefore, I predict: 
Hypothesis 1: Auditors rely less on independent expectations generated with more 
opaque audit methods than independent expectations generated with less opaque 
audit methods.  
 
2.3 Auditor Psychological Ownership of Independent Expectations (H2) 
Given an opaque source, individuals may also prefer their own judgment or that of 
a human expert because they are more familiar with or trust the source more. Research 
finds that individuals have an overall lower trust of non-human sources and believe the 
decision process from human experts are easier to understand (Yeomans, Shah, 
Mullainathan, and Kleinberg 2017; Castelo, Bos, Lehmann 2019). Auditors may therefore 
rely more on independent expectations if they feel they are their own. I argue that auditors’ 
psychological ownership of independent expectations increases reliance on expectations, 
but only when using more opaque audit methods. Psychological ownership is a feeling that 
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something is “mine” and can be felt towards tangible and intangible targets (Shu and Peck 
2011; Brown et al. 2014). For example, individuals can feel psychological ownership of 
their work (Pierce et al. 2004; Bauer et al. 2018) or items they create (Parè, Sicotte, and 
Jacque 2006; Franke, Schreier, and Kaier 2010).  
Psychological ownership develops through three routes—investing ones’ own 
ideas, skills, and cognitive resources into the target; experiencing control over the target 
and how tasks are carried out; and having a depth and breadth of knowledge, 
understanding, and association with the target (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks 2001; Brown et 
al. 2014). Research also finds that certain aspects of work environments, such as autonomy, 
participative decision-making, and job complexity, affect development of psychological 
ownership (Pierce et al. 2004; Brown et al. 2014). Auditors can have different levels of 
responsibility for generating independent expectations, such as completing steps to 
calculate an independent expectation based on inputs that are provided to them or using 
their professional judgment to develop the inputs and calculate the expectation. When 
auditors are more involved in decision-making, particularly using their professional 
judgment, they should develop more psychological ownership of independent expectations 
because they will experience greater control and critical thinking.  
Research further shows that psychological ownership affects judgments and 
decisions related to targets of ownership. For example, psychological ownership of ones’ 
work is associated with greater commitment to and favorable evaluations of ones’ job and 
organization as well as ones’ own ideas and skills (Mayhew, Ashkanasy, Bramble, and. 
Gardner 2007; Bauer et al. 2018; MacKenzie 2019). Favorable evaluations of targets of 
ownership occur because individuals associate the targets with themselves, and people 
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have an innate desire to look good to others (Beggan 1992; Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and 
Becker 2007). 
Favorable evaluation of tangible items is greater when the items are chosen or 
created relative to when individuals simply possess or use items (Gawronski et al. 2007; 
Franke et al. 2010; Troye and Supphellen 2012). Relatedly, research finds that preference 
to rely on human versus non-human sources, including decision aids and “algorithm 
advice,” is partially mitigated when individuals are more involved in the development of 
the non-human decision tool, likely because they experience more control and critical 
thinking (Whitecotton and Butler 1998; Kaplan, Reneau, and Whitecotton 2001; Parè et al. 
2006; Dietvorst et al. 2018).  
I expect that auditors will rely more on their “own” independent expectations 
relative to expectations for which they feel less ownership. I argue, however, that the effect 
of auditors’ ownership on increasing their reliance on independent expectations is more 
critical when using more opaque methods. Increased ownership of and familiarity with the 
process underlying independent expectations could help reduce feelings of opacity. 
Alternatively, because understanding of independent expectations should be higher when 
using less opaque audit methods, developing psychological ownership of independent 
expectations likely has less impact on reliance. Formally stated: 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of auditor psychological ownership of independent 
expectations on their reliance on expectations is greater when they use more opaque 
audit methods than when they use less opaque audit methods.  
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Refer to Figure 2-1 – Predicted pattern of auditors’ reliance on independent 
expectations, across levels of opacity and ownership of the independent expectation.below 
for a graph representing the predicted pattern of means indicated by Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2.  
 
Figure 2-1 – Predicted pattern of auditors’ reliance on independent expectations, 




CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Setting and Experimental Design 
I test my hypotheses with an experiment using practicing senior auditors.3 I 
developed a case wherein participants assume the role of an in-charge auditor tasked with 
completing year-end substantive testing of a hypothetical client’s product warranty accrual. 
Participants complete certain steps to generate an independent expectation of the accrual 
and assess the reasonableness of the client’s recorded account balance. I use warranty 
accrual in the case because warranty accruals are often material and can be used to manage 
earnings (Cohen, Durrough, Huang, and Zach 2017). Time limits were not given so as to 
not introduce time pressure as a potential confounding factor. 
I recruited senior auditors from two Big 4 audit firms to complete the experiment. 
167 auditors completed the study in person with a paper and pencil instrument. I drop six 
participants who viewed incorrect information, which affects the validity of their responses 
(discussed in more detail below), leaving me with a final sample of 161 participants.4 One 
participant is a manager, 32 (19.9 percent) are experienced seniors, and the remaining 128 
(79.5 percent) are first-year seniors. Participants receive background information that is 
relevant to their tests of the product warranty accrual, the current and prior year accrual 
balances, and a description of the client’s process to estimate the accrual. They then receive 
 
3 I received IRB approval from the university where the study was conducted. 
 
4 Note that not all participants responded to all dependent variables or post-experimental questionnaire 
(“PEQ”) items. I use all available responses in my analyses; thus, sample sizes may differ across analyses. 
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information to generate the independent expectation. Finally, participants receive the 
materiality threshold, respond to the dependent variable, and complete a brief 
questionnaire. 
3.2 Independent Variables 
I manipulate two independent variables related to the method to generate the 
independent expectation, for a 2 (method opacity) x 2 (psychological ownership) between-
participants design.  
3.2.1 Opacity Manipulation 
I manipulate opacity in both the description of the computational method used as 
well as the output from the method used to generate the independent expectation. Namely, 
the case states that the independent expectation is generated in a data analytics tool using 
predictive modeling (More Opaque condition) or in Excel using a specified calculation 
(Less Opaque condition).5 The tool output, which they receive after the ownership 
manipulation (discussed below), indicates the same inputs and total output (i.e., expected 
warranty claims, which represents the independent expectation) across opacity conditions. 
The output does not (does) show the process, namely the specific calculation linking the 
inputs and outputs, in the More Opaque condition (Less Opaque condition). Refer to figures 
 
5 I refer to the tool in the More Opaque condition as “a data analytics tool” rather than a specific software 
package based on feedback from a Big 4 audit firm who reviewed my materials. They noted that audit firms 
often develop their own proprietary software. On the other hand, I use “Excel” for the Less Opaque 
condition since all firms use it, and auditors use it daily for almost every audit task. Using a generic 
description does potentially allow for greater variability in participants’ perception of the tool but allows 
for better comparison across firms. Untabulated analysis of PEQ questions indicates that participants 
perceived the tool in the More Opaque condition to be a “firm tool” more than in the Less Opaque 
condition (p < .01 one-tailed), providing evidence that participants thought about the data analytics 
software that their own firm uses. 
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below for excerpts from the experimental materials of the description (Figure 3-1, Panels 
















Figure 3-1 – Opacity Manipulation: Description of Method 









































Figure 3-2 – Opacity Manipulation: Output of Tool 
Panel A: Less Opaque condition 
Panel B: More Opaque condition 
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3.2.2 Ownership Manipulation 
Participants use their judgment to choose (More Ownership condition) or are told 
that their team has chosen (Less Ownership condition) a critical input to the independent 
expectation—namely, which product factor(s) to include in the calculation to account for 
factors for which warranty rates or costs may vary.6 I make certain design choices to bolster 
the effect of their choices on psychological ownership, particularly experiencing control 
and critical thinking. One, the case does not provide explicit information as to the “correct” 
factors. Rather, the case provides background information to help participants understand 
and think about how warranty failure rates or costs could differ across product categories 
in general. In practice, such inputs are subjective and based on professional judgment. 
Two, participants in the More Ownership condition are asked to briefly explain 
their choice so that they will be less likely to select factors without reason. In the study, 
participants do not face any real risks or costs associated with choosing any or all of the 
factors while in a real audit setting, auditors are generally required to document their 
decisions, which would entail justifying their choices. Refer to Figure 3-3, Panels A and 
B, below for excerpt from the experimental materials of the ownership manipulation. 7 
 
6 The factors that are included in the Less Ownership condition are based on those chosen by participants in 
pilot tests, so that the factors included in the independent expectation will be similar across conditions. 
 
7 It is critical that participants feel that the independent expectation is linked to the specified inputs and 
model or calculation. In the paper and pencil administration of the experimental instrument, I used an 
“envelope” system. In the More Ownership condition, I provided a sealed envelope for each factor or 
combination of factors. Participants were asked to open the envelope that corresponds to their specified 
factors and leave others sealed. The six participants I drop from the sample opened incorrect envelopes. I 
provided only one sealed envelope in the Less Ownership condition, which includes the factors stated in the 
case as selected by their team. Participants were told that the envelopes contain “the output from a data 
analytics tool (Excel) of the model (calculation), which was pre-generated using the specified inputs.” 
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3.2.3 Information Controls 
Across conditions, I control on the information and quality of the independent 
expectation in several ways. Specifically, I hold constant the inputs to the independent 
expectation (the description of the data used and the critical inputs), the source of the model 
or calculation (e.g., that it is a firm-prescribed method), the description of how it is used 
(e.g., that the model or calculation “computes expected future warranty claim costs based 
on relationships between historical warranty costs and sales data”), and the dollar value of 
the independent expectation.8  
3.3 Dependent Variables 
After receiving the independent expectation, participants respond to the dependent 
variable question. Specifically, participants evaluate whether the client’s accrual balance 
is materially misstated on an 11-point Likert-type scale.9 I infer auditors’ reliance on the 
independent expectation from their responses: since participants both generate an 
independent expectation and receive management’s estimate, and I hold constant the dollar 
values of both, greater (less) reliance on the independent expectation should result in more 
(less) weight placed on the expectation and in a higher (lower) assessed likelihood of 
material misstatement.  
 
8 I ask a few questions in the PEQ to measure perceived differences in information or quality of the 
independent expectation across opacity conditions. Specifically, I ask participants whether (1) they are 
confident that the independent expectation is an accurate estimate of product warranty, (2) the method was 
prescribed by the firm, and (3) the independent expectation considered significantly more factors than 
management’s estimate. Responses indicate no differences in perceptions of the method across opacity 
conditions (untabulated). 
 
9 Reliance is participants’ response to the following question: “how likely is the client’s product warranty 
accrual to be materially misstated?”  
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In the PEQ, I measure participants’ psychological ownership of the independent 
expectation, which also serves as a manipulation check for psychological ownership, on an 
11-point Likert-type scale.10 These questions were adapted from scales developed and 
validated in prior research (Van Dyne and Pierce 2004; Brown et al. 2014).  
I also ask participants how familiar they are with product warranty, which provides 
a measure of task experience. While my senior auditor participants are appropriately 
matched to an audit estimate task (Libby et al. 2002), those who lack familiarity with the 
specific type of estimate used in my experimental case, namely product warranty, may not 
be. One, low experience with a product warranty estimates would also affect understanding 
of the related independent expectation, over and above the understanding of a method used 
to generate that expectation. Two, the nature of my independent variable 
operationalizations requires reasonable understanding of key elements of the case. Recall 
that participants in the More Ownership condition are required to make a decision 
regarding a critical input to the product warranty independent expectation. Therefore, I 




10 I measure psychological ownership using two questions, (“I feel the independent expectation is my own.” 
and “I feel a high degree of personal ownership of the independent expectation.”). The Cronbach’s alpha 
score for the two psychological ownership measures is 0.911, which is within accepted reliability 
thresholds (Peterson 1994). Therefore, for analyses involving psychological ownership, I use the average of 
these two questions. Inferences do not change if I use either of the two questions in my analyses. 
 
11 The mean (median) of reported familiarity with product warranty is 3.43 (3.00). For analyses involving 
reported task experience, I use a median split based on reported experience.  
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
4.1 Manipulation Checks 
As discussed, opacity is manipulated in two ways. One, the independent 
expectation is generated either with predictive modeling (More Opaque condition) or a 
basic calculation in Excel (Less Opaque condition). Participants report less (more) 
experience using tools “similar to the one described in the case” in the More Opaque 
condition (Less Opaque condition) (t154 = 3.624, p = 0.001 one-tailed). Two, the detail 
underlying the calculation process in the More Opaque condition (Less Opaque condition) 
is not (is) provided in the tool output. Participants report less (more) ability to “clearly see 
the process to calculate the independent expectation” in the More Opaque condition (Less 
Opaque condition) (t157 = 3.099, p = 0.001 one-tailed). Further, responses to post-
experimental questions indicate that participants understand the independent expectation 
less (more) in the More Opaque condition (t157 = 2.409, p = 0.009 one-tailed).  
To assess whether participants attended to my psychological ownership 
manipulation, I evaluate responses to the PEQ questions related to the development of 
psychological ownership. I find that choosing the critical input is associated with greater 
feelings of contribution to the development of the expectation (t158 = 2.828, p = 0.003 one-
tailed); control over the development of the independent expectation (t157 = 4.333, p < .001 
one-tailed); and overall feelings of ownership of the independent expectation (t158 = 1.885, 
p = 0.031 one-tailed). Overall, my manipulations appear to have worked as intended. 
 
 28
4.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Summary of hypotheses 
I predict that auditors rely less on independent expectations generated using more 
opaque methods than expectations generated using less opaque methods (H1). Further, I 
predict that the effect of auditor psychological ownership of independent expectations on 
reliance is greater when using more opaque versus less opaque methods, thus mitigating 
the negative effects of method opacity on reliance (H2). My theory suggests that ownership 
increases reliance on independent expectations more when using more opaque audit 
methods because the opacity underlying opaque methods could affect understanding of the 
output but that auditors would be more willing to rely on their “own” expectations. Refer 
to Figure 2-1 for a visual representation of my hypotheses. 
4.2.2 Results of ANOVA (Opacity x Ownership) 
I first examine the effect of my two independent variables on my dependent 
variable, using a full-factorial 2x2 ANOVA. Figure 4-1 plots the means by 
experimental condition, and Table 4-1, Panel A reports the means and standard 
deviations by experimental condition. The ANOVA ( 
Table 4-1, Panel B) indicates that the predicted interaction term is not significant 




Figure 4-1 – Plot of observed means of dependent variable measuring participants’ 
reliance on the independent expectation, across experimental conditions. 
 
Table 4-1, Panel A – Descriptive statistics for dependent variable measuring reliance 
on the independent expectation, across experimental conditions (mean, (standard 
deviation) ) 
 Psychological Ownership 




n = 42 
5.31 
(2.29) 
n = 36 
5.44 
(2.32) 




n = 35 
5.28 
(2.33) 
n = 39 
5.46 
(2.39) 




n = 77 
5.29 
(2.29) 




Table 4-1, Panel B – Reliance 2x2 ANOVA 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 
Opacity (H1) 1 .012 .002 .963 
Psychological Ownership 1 3.807 .690 .408 
Opacity x Ownership (H2) 1 .324 .059 .809 
Error 150 5.519   
 
4.2.3 Results of contrast tests 
I next perform follow-up contrast tests. Recall that H2 predicts an ordinal 
interaction, and more specifically, my hypothesis development led me to predict the 
specific pattern of means noted in Figure 2-1. The standard ANOVA test does not allow 
me to test the specific pattern of means in H2; therefore, I use planned contrast testing as a 
more powerful test of my interaction and to allow me to test the predicted pattern of means 
(Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990; Guggenmos, Piercey, and Agoglia 2018).  
I follow the three-step approach established by Guggenmos, et al. (2018) to test my 
hypotheses. I assign a contrast code of -3 to the More Opaque, Less Ownership condition 
and codes of +1 to all other conditions. I first examine the visual fit of the contrast codes 
and the observed data. I note that the pattern suggested by my hypotheses and contrast 
codes (Figure 2-1) does not match the observed data (Figure 4-1). I next examine the 
statistical results of the contrast test and the between-cells variance test. As reported in 
Table 4-1, Panel C, test results indicate a non-significant contrast (p = 0.532) and a non-
 31
significant residual between-cells variance (p = 0.841). I evaluate the contrast variance 
residual metric, or q2, which identifies the proportion of between-cells variance that the 
contrast does not explain. Results (untabulated) indicate that q2 = 0.452, which indicates 
that the contrast does not explain 45.2% of the between-cells variance.  
Table 4-1, Panel C – Contrast and residual between-cells variance test 
Source SS df MS F-statistic p-value 
Contrast 2.167 1 2.167 0.393 0.532 
Residual between-cells variance 1.908 2 0.954 0.173 0.841 
Error 827.899 150 5.519   
 
4.3 Effect of Task Experience 
4.3.1 Results of ANOVA (Opacity x Ownership x Task Experience) 
As discussed in the preceding section, auditors’ relative task experience could also 
affect understanding of, and in turn reliance on, independent expectations. My predictions 
therefore assume experiment participants have sufficient knowledge of the product 
warranty setting used in the case (Libby et al. 2002). However, many participants reported 
little or no familiarity with product warranty, which could be driven by industry 
specialization. The mean (median) of reported familiarity with product warranty is 3.43 
(3.00) on an 11-point Likert-type scale, with 43.3 percent reporting below the median (2 
or less).  
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To examine the potential effects of task experience, I split participants into two 
groups based on the median of their reported experience with product warranty and include 
it with my two independent variables in a full-factorial 2x2x2 ANOVA. The ANOVA 
(Table 4-2, Panel A) indicates a marginally significant 3-way interaction term for the 
method opacity, auditor psychological ownership, and task experience (F1, 144 = 2.999, p = 
0.085) and a marginally significant interaction term of method opacity and task experience 
(F1, 144 = 2.704, p = 0.102). None of the remaining main effects or interaction terms are 
significant. The results suggest that the effect of ownership on reliance on the independent 
expectation differs across levels of opacity, as expected, but that task experience also 
matters in my setting.  
Table 4-2, Panel A – Reliance 2x2x2 ANOVA 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 
Opacity (H1) 1 .839 .155 .694 
Psychological Ownership 1 .566 .105 .747 
Task Experience 1 8.294 1.532 .218 
Opacity x Ownership (H2) 1 .714 .132 .717 
Opacity x Task Experience 1 13.115 2.422 .122 
Ownership x Task Experience 1 14.641 2.704 .102 
Opacity x Ownership x Task 
Experience 
1 16.238 2.999 .085 
Error 144 5.415   
 
 33
To further understand these results, I examine the effects of opacity and ownership 
on participants’ reliance on the independent expectation separately for each of the two task 
experience groups. Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 plot the means for the More Task Experience 
and Less Task Experience groups, respectively. Across both levels of experience, when 
auditors generate an expectation using a less opaque method, increased auditor ownership 
of the expectation does not appear to affect reliance, consistent with my theory. When 
auditors generate an expectation using a more opaque method, auditor ownership appears 
to affect reliance, but task experience also matters.  
 
Figure 4-2 – Plot of observed means of dependent variable measuring participants’ 
reliance on the independent expectation, across experimental conditions, for 





Figure 4-3 – Plot of observed means of dependent variable measuring participants’ 
reliance on the independent expectation, across experimental conditions, for 
participants who report less task experience 
4.4 Tests of Hypotheses – More Task Experience group 
Since participants who report some task experience are most appropriately matched 





12 Participants who report a 0, 1, 2, or 3 (4 or greater) on an 11-point scale are included in the Less 
Experience (More Experience) group. Note that inferences remain unchanged if I include participants who 
report a 3 in the More Experience group rather than the Less Experience group. Inferences also remain 
unchanged if I use a reduced sample and exclude participants who report a 0 or 1, instead of the More 
Experience group  
 
For the Less Experience group, the ANOVA indicates no effect of opacity (F1,87 = 0.873, p = 0.353) or 
ownership (F1, 87 = 1.971, p = 0.164) on reliance on the independent expectation or an interaction of the 
variables (F1, 87 = 1.045, p = 0.309), all untabulated. Note that I conduct a contrast test for the More 
Experience group; the pattern of means indicated by the contrast codes used in my analysis do not match 
the observed data for the Less Experience group. 
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4.4.1 Results of ANOVA (Opacity x Ownership) – More Task Experience group 




Table 4-2, Panel C reports the ANOVA results for the More Task Experience group. 
For the More Experience group, the ANOVA indicates no effect of opacity (F1,57 = 2.119, 
p = 0.151) on reliance on the independent expectation, although results are directionally 
consistent with H1. I do not find a significant interaction of opacity and ownership (F1, 57 
= 2.239, p = 0.309) on participants’ reliance, although the pattern of means aligns with H2.  
Table 4-2, Panel B – Descriptive statistics for reliance on the independent 
expectation, across experimental conditions (mean, (standard deviation) ) (More 
Task Experience group) 
 Psychological Ownership 




n = 16 
5.35 
(2.29) 
n = 17 
5.52 
(2.17) 




n = 12 
5.38 
(2.29) 
n = 16 
4.82 
(2.06) 




n = 28 
5.36 
(2.18) 







Table 4-2, Panel C – Reliance 2x2 ANOVA (More Task Experience group) 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 
Opacity (H1) 1 9.369 2.119 .151 
Psychological Ownership 1 3.429 .776 .382 
Opacity x Ownership (H2) 1 9.899 2.239 .140 
Error 57 4.421   
 
4.4.2 Results of contrast tests – More Task Experience group 
I next perform my follow-up contrast testing for the More Experience group, using 
the same planned contrast codes discussed for my full sample tests (-3 for More 
Opaque, Less Ownership; +1 for all other conditions). Visual inspection of the 
predicted pattern (Figure 2-1) and observed data, for the More Task Experience 
group (Figure 4-2), suggests a fit of the data to the pattern suggested by my theory 
and contrast codes. Statistical results of the contrast test are reported in  
 
 
Table 4-2, Panel D. Test results indicate a significant planned contrast (p = 0.044) 
and a non-significant residual between-cells variance (p = 0.867), which provides support 
for a significant interaction. Results (untabulated) further indicate that q2 = 0.053, which 
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indicates that the contrast does not explain 5.3% of the between-cells variance (and does 




Table 4-2, Panel D – Contrast and residual between-cells variance test (More Task 
Experience group) 
Source SS df MS F-statistic p-value 
Contrast 18.318 1 18.318 4.252 .044 
Residual between-cells variance 1.235 2 0.617 0.143 .867 
Error 254.161 59 4.308   
 
4.4.3 Results of simple main effects tests – More Task Experience group 
I further test my hypotheses with simple effects tests, reported in Table 4-2, Panel 
E. I find that when auditors have less ownership of independent expectations, they rely on 
the expectations less when they use more opaque methods compared to when they use less 
opaque methods (t = 2.047, p = 0.045). When auditors have more ownership of independent 
expectations, I no longer find a statistically significant difference in reliance across level 
of opacity (t = 0.137, p = 0.892). This difference in reliance is mitigated because ownership 
increases reliance for auditors who use more opaque methods (t = 1.565, p = 0.123). Taken 






Table 4-2, Panel E – Simple main effects tests (More Task Experience group) 
Comparison 
Contrast 
Value t-statistic df p-value 
     
More Opaque (Less Ownership)     
vs Less Opaque (Less Ownership) 1.604 2.047 59 0.045 
vs More Opaque (More Ownership) -1.211 -1.565 59 0.123 
vs Less Opaque (More Ownership) -1.306 -1.707 59 0.093 
     
Less Opaque (More Ownership)     
vs Less Opaque (Less Ownership) 0.299 0.424 59 0.673 
vs More Opaque (More Ownership) 0.095 0.137 59 0.892 
 
4.5 Additional Analysis: Effects of Task Experience, by Level of Opacity 
To further understand my three-way interaction of opacity, ownership, and task 
experience, I also examine the effects of ownership and task experience on participants’ 
reliance on the independent expectation separately for each of the two levels of opacity. 
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 plot the means and Table 4-3, Panel A and Table 4-3, Panel C 
report the means and standard deviations for the More Opaque and Less Opaque 
conditions, respectively. Table 4-3, Panel B and Table 4-3, Panel D below report the 
ANOVA results for the More Opaque and Less Opaque conditions, respectively.  
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Figure 4-4 – Plot of observed means of dependent variable measuring participants’ 
reliance on the independent expectation, across levels of Ownership and reported 
levels of Task Experience (More Opaque condition) 
 
 
Figure 4-5 – Plot of observed means of dependent variable measuring participants’ 
reliance on the independent expectation, across levels of Ownership and reported 
levels of Task Experience (Less Opaque condition) 
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For the More Opaque condition, the ANOVA (Table 4-3, Panel B) indicates a 
significant disordinal interaction of ownership and task experience (F1, 70 = 5.319, p = .024). 
The plot of means suggests that for auditors with some task experience, ownership appears 
to increase reliance on the independent expectation, consistent with my theory. 
Interestingly, for auditors with lower levels of task experience, ownership may reduce 
reliance on the expectation. The ANOVA further indicates an effect of task experience on 
reliance. Participants who reported more task experience relied less on the independent 
expectation (mean = 5.20) than those who reported lower levels of task experience (mean 
= 5.62, F1, 70 = 4.087, p = .047).  
 
Table 4-3, Panel A – Descriptive statistics for reliance on the independent 
expectation, across levels of Ownership and reported Task Experience (mean, 
(standard deviation) ) (More Opaque condition) 
 Psychological Ownership 




n = 23 
5.22 
(2.50) 
n = 23 
5.85 
(2.51) 




n = 12 
5.38 
(2.13) 
n = 16 
4.82 
(2.06) 




n = 35 
5.28 
(2.33) 





Table 4-3, Panel B – Reliance 2x2 ANOVA (More Opaque condition) 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 
Psychological Ownership 1 .004 .001 .978 
Task Experience 1 21.503 4.087 .047 
Ownership x Task Experience 1 27.989 5.319 .024 
Error 70 5.262   
 
These results could indicate that those with more task experience understand 
enough to question the more opaque independent expectation, but in turn have improved 
reliance with psychological ownership, as predicted. Alternatively, those with less task 
experience likely do not understand the underlying estimate or the inputs well enough to 
scrutinize the more opaque independent expectation, leading to potential “blind” reliance. 
In this case, ownership could help temper the effect. However, for participants who did not 
have any required involvement in developing the independent expectation, namely those 
in the Less Ownership condition, they may not have felt accountability for the judgment 
made, which could lead to reduced motivation to scrutinize the evidence. For example, 
auditors in practice would be required to document and explain conclusions to superiors 
and/or the client. Thus, results may not generalize outside of the experiment, and further 
research may be warranted to further examine task experience and the potential for blind 
reliance.  
For the Less Opaque condition, the ANOVA (Table 4-3, Panel D) indicates no 
effect of ownership (F1, 74 = .240, p = .625) or task experience (F1, 74 = .084, p = .772) on 
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reliance on the independent expectation or an interaction of the variables (F1, 74 = .016, p = 
.901). My theory suggests that because less opaque methods are easier to understand, 
psychological ownership of independent expectations would not be critical for reliance. 
These results are consistent with my theory.  
Table 4-3, Panel C – Descriptive statistics for reliance on the independent 
expectation, across levels of Ownership and reported Experience (mean, (standard 
deviation) ) (Less Opaque condition) 
 
Table 4-3, Panel D – Reliance 2x2 ANOVA (Less Opaque condition) 
Source of Variation df MS F-statistic p-value 
Psychological Ownership 1 1.337 .240 .625 
Task Experience 1 .469 .084 .772 
Ownership x Task Experience 1 .087 .016 .901 
Error 74 5.560   
  
 Psychological Ownership 




n = 26 
5.26 
(2.35) 
n = 19 
5.38 
(2.44) 




n = 16 
5.35 
(2.29) 
n = 17 
5.52 
(2.17) 




n = 42 
5.31 
(2.29) 
n = 36 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary of results 
In this study, I examine auditors’ reliance on independence expectations of 
estimates. I argue that the methods auditors use to generate independent expectations can 
affect their reliance on expectations. Specifically, I predict that auditors’ reliance depends 
jointly on their use of opaque methods and their psychological ownership of independent 
expectations. I hypothesize that opacity of audit methods can interfere with reliance on 
independent expectations because opacity affects understanding. However, I further 
predict that auditors’ psychological ownership of independent expectations improves 
reliance on expectations developed using more opaque methods because auditors are more 
likely to rely on their “own” expectations, while ownership is less critical for increasing 
reliance on independent expectations generated using less opaque methods, since these 
independent expectations are easier to understand. 
Results of an experiment with senior auditors from two Big 4 firms indicate that 
when auditors generate an independent expectation using a more opaque method, auditor 
ownership in the expectation affects reliance but that task experience moderates the effects. 
Specifically, for auditors with some prior familiarity with the audit area, who are best 
matched to the experimental task, an ordinal interaction of opacity and ownership supports 
my hypotheses.  
5.2 Contributions 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. I add to research on 
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auditors’ judgments and decision making when auditing estimates. Prior work has 
examined auditors’ professional skepticism, such as improving critical thinking and 
information processing during the examination of evidence (GHKY 2015; Rasso 2015; 
Tegeler 2018; Hong 2019), auditors’ reliance on specialists’ work (Griffith 2018; Estep 
2021), and the effect of factors such as subjectivity and uncertainty and the timing of 
evidence (Griffin 2014; Fitzgerald et al. 2020). However, even when auditors do have 
disconfirming evidence, they may under-rely on such evidence, and I demonstrate ways to 
increase reliance on contradictory evidence.  
I examine variables that can affect reliance on independent expectations that have 
not been previously examined (Griffin 2014; Fitzgerald et al. 2020). My findings shed 
additional light on auditors’ reliance on independent expectations but can also generalize 
more broadly to evidence that contradicts management’s assertions. Prior research suggests 
that generating independent expectations of management estimates can mitigate over-
reliance on management evidence; however, use of independent expectations does not 
necessarily lead to full reliance on them. Reliance is subject to judgment—auditors will 
also compare independent expectations to management evidence, and estimates are 
inherently subjective.  
Given my operationalization of audit method opacity using predictive modeling, a 
type of data analytics, I also answer a call to conduct research on the behavioral 
implications of auditors’ use of data analytics (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015; Earley 2015). I 
also add to recent research on the effect of data analytics on accounting judgments. Recent 
research has examined auditors’ and investors’ reliance on human versus data analytic 
advice (Chen et al. 2018; Commerford et al. 2020) and the effect of data visualizations on 
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auditor judgments (Rose et al. 2017 and 2019). I examine auditors’ reliance on data analytic 
methods relative to non-ADA tools. I develop new theory for why individuals may rely 
less on ADA methods; specifically, my results suggest that attributes of different methods, 
such as opacity, affect reliance on output from the methods.  
This study also has implications for practice. Findings suggest that certain methods 
are more opaque to auditors. Further, auditor ownership of their work and auditors’ task 
experience are critical considerations when using more opaque methods in practice. Less 
experienced auditors (e.g., junior staff or new seniors) may be tasked with utilizing certain 
opaque methods, such as ADA, given their more relevant university education. 
Outsourcing of simpler audit tasks has also led firms to push more complex tasks, such as 
the audit of estimates, down to less experienced staff. Less experienced staff may not 
understand the specific task, such as the type of estimate, very well, and my results indicate 
that task experience can impact reliance on ADA.  
Audit firms may also engage firm specialists to develop ADA because engagement 
team auditors lack sufficient experience with such tools and methods, suggesting that 
engagement team auditors should be less involved. Prior research suggests that auditors 
may not fully rely on specialists’ work (Griffith 2018). Engagement team auditors would 
have client-specific knowledge that would prove useful for fine-tuning analytics that are 
developed by specialists. Future research could explore whether auditor involvement and 
ownership could also improve reliance on specialists’ work. 
5.3 Limitations 
This study is not without limitations. Participants did not engage with a real tool or 
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software, which could influence their judgments. However, by not having participants 
perform a real calculation, I cleanly control for the work done and time spent by 
participants in the case as well as the output, outside of the level of opacity. Participants 
also did not have as much information as they would in a real audit to help make choices 
regarding the factors. Therefore, inferences I make in this study may not generalize to 
scenarios where auditors have significantly more information.  
For participants who reported less task experience, I found no evidence of an effect 
of opacity or ownership; however, directionally, participants relied more on the 
independent expectation generated with a more opaque method, with contradicts H1. Prior 
research finds that individuals can “blindly” rely on recommendations from opaque or 
“black box” decision tools when they do not know what to question (Parasuraman and 
Manzey 2010). However, any observed results for participants who reported low task 
experience may not generalize outside of my experimental setting. In practice, auditors 
have the ability to gain an understanding of the task or area before completing the work 
(for example, reading prior year workpapers, speaking with engagement team members, or 
referencing accounting standards). In my experimental setting, however, participants have 
limited time and background information to gain sufficient understanding. Future research 
may be warranted to examine the effects of task experience as a manipulated variable. 
In addition, most of my participants were new seniors who had not yet completed 
a busy season as an in-charge auditor. In addition to an effect on task experience, more 
experienced auditors may make different judgments if they are more attuned to client 
pressure or preferences to confirm management’s numbers. For example, greater opacity 
of output and unfamiliarity with more opaque methods could cause more experienced 
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auditors (i.e., experienced seniors or managers) to question the output more. Additional 
research could examine the effect of experience, aside from task experience, or examine 
settings where a preference to confirm management’s estimate (e.g., a supervisor 
preference) is salient.  
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